El Estado administrativo en Estados Unidos: bases de la reforma organizativa del segundo gobierno Trump

Walter Zellweger-Córdoba

doi:10.24965/da.11537

Authors

Walter Zellweger-Córdoba Universidad de Salamanca (España – Spain) https://orcid.org/0009-0002-9249-1988

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.24965/da.11537

Keywords:

Administrative state, administrative reform, Department of Government Efficiency, DOGE, federal civil service, United States public administration, unitary executive, administrative organization, government efficiency

Abstract

Objectives: The purpose of this article is to study and publicize the programmatic bases that articulate the organizational reform of the Federal government of the United States undertaken in the first months of the second Trump administration’s through the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE). Methodology: The analysis of the approved rules affecting the Federal Government organization and the federal civil service, in addition to the judicial documentation of some of the first controversies that have been arised. Results: The finding that a radical and controversial transformation of the Government organization has been projected, tending towards greater politicization and the weakening of its structures. Conclusions: The will of the Trump administration to initiate a period of retrogression in the Government, which will affect its organizations and human resources alike for the transition towards a politicized, reduced and centralized apparatus, subjected to the political direction of the president.

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Author Biography

Walter Zellweger-Córdoba, Universidad de Salamanca (España – Spain)

Investigador predoctoral en la Universidad de Salamanca. Graduado en Ciencia Política y Administración Pública (mención en Administración Pública) y Máster en Gestión Administrativa, en los que obtuvo el Premio Extraordinario de Grado y de Máster.

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