¿Por qué algunos países sufren exceso de regulación?
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.24965/gapp.vi26-27.347Keywords:
Carga reguladora, procedimientos administrativos, economía política, elección racional, sistema judicialAbstract
¿Por qué algunos países sufren exceso de regulación?
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References
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