¿Por qué algunos países sufren exceso de regulación?

Authors

  • Víctor Lapuente Giné

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.24965/gapp.vi26-27.347

Keywords:

Carga reguladora, procedimientos administrativos, economía política, elección racional, sistema judicial

Abstract

¿Por qué algunos países sufren exceso de regulación?

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Author Biography

Víctor Lapuente Giné

Doctor en Ciencias Políticas por la Universidad de Oxford. Master of Arts in Social Sciences, Juan March Institute, Madrid. Master in Public Management, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, ESADE. En la actualidad trabaja como investigador en la Universidad de Gotemburgo (Suecia) Department of Political Science and Department of Economics. Sus investigaciones abarcan política comparada, reformas en la administración pública y cuestiones relacionadas con corrupción y buen gobierno. Sus trabajos han sido publicados en revistas como European Journal of Political Science, Party Politics, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Governance o Local Government Studies.

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Published

31-08-2003

How to Cite

Lapuente Giné, V. (2003). ¿Por qué algunos países sufren exceso de regulación?. Gestión Y Análisis De Políticas Públicas, (26-27), 7–23. https://doi.org/10.24965/gapp.vi26-27.347