Cincuenta años de trabajo duro: trabajando en los (¿yermos?) viñedos de la Administración pública


  • Bert A. Rockman



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Cómo citar

A. Rockman, B. (2000). Cincuenta años de trabajo duro: trabajando en los (¿yermos?) viñedos de la Administración pública. Gestión Y Análisis De Políticas Públicas, (17-18), 39–53.
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