Capture al Estado, capture el día. Captura del Estado, corrupción e influencia en la transición

Autores/as

  • Joel S. Hellman
  • Geraint Geraint
  • Jones Jones
  • Daniel Kaufmann

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.24965/gapp.vi21.262

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Citas

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Para más detalles acerca de las referencias bibliográficas: www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance.

Publicado

31-08-2001

Cómo citar

S. Hellman, J., Geraint, G., Jones, J., & Kaufmann, D. (2001). Capture al Estado, capture el día. Captura del Estado, corrupción e influencia en la transición. Gestión Y Análisis De Políticas Públicas, (21), 35-62. https://doi.org/10.24965/gapp.vi21.262

Número

Sección

CORRUPCION POLITICA