Regulation and quality of liberalized public services
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.24965/gapp.vi32.382Keywords:
Public services, liberalization, quality of public services, regulation, evaluationAbstract
The liberalization of network industries (public utilities: telecoms, electricity, gas, water supply, transport and postal services) stand implicitly for a promise of fostering the competition, forcing prices down and improving the quality of services delivered to consumers. However, a preliminary assessment shows that quality of services might be the «hidden cost» of the liberalization process. During the last few years, theoretical and empirical research has focussed more intensively on how regulators ought to use more suitable mechanisms to introduce quality in incentive regulations. In this paper I first examine some of the complex problems that arise when we want to define what «the quality of service» is in network industries, given that this is a multidimensional issue. Second, I review the different approaches used to adjust the quality of service to consumer preferences. Third, I focus on the mechanisms used more frequently by regulators to reduce the asymmetric information problem and to introduce quality of service in the incentive schemes. Fourth, I raise the question of the need to create institutions to develop a systematic process of quality definition and outcome assessment. Finally, I conclude that all that can be measured get better, while any thing that cannot be measured get worse.Downloads
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